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Abstract
We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents
live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes
choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own
consumption and the human capital and environmental quality en-
dowed to her oﬀspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly
between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the
only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their
income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the
allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and
education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each ac-
tivity. In this context, two self-fulﬁlling stable equilibria can emerge,
one associated with high and another with low corruption. Corrupted
politicians induce high levels of tax evasion, reducing total public funds
and thus environmental protection activities. This result is in accor-
dance with existing empirical evidence and implies that environmental
policies may fail in corrupt countries where they are used as means
of supporting rent seeking activities instead of protecting the environ-
ment. A higher level political authority could intervene and force the
low corruption equilibrium by choosing the appropriate tax rate and,
through institutional changes, the rates of peculation.
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11 Introduction
Corruption in its various forms is a long-lasting phenomenon prevalent in
most contemporary societies. There are abundant examples not only in de-
veloping countries such as China, India, and Philippines and in transition
economies such as Russia, but also in developed countries.1 Its detrimental
eﬀects have been extensively analyzed, covering a wide range of social and
economic aspects. Corruption has been studied extensively by many social
scientists including political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and law
scholars. A few economists have contributed to the study of corruption in
the past but more recently this research area is attracting growing interest.2
An u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent analytic approaches to corruption have been developed
examining among other issues, the degree of benevolence of the policy maker,
the role of institutions in determining the level of corruption and the eﬀect
of corruption on growth.
An interesting question arises with regards to the relationship between
corruption and tax evasion. The literature indicates that corruption has a
signiﬁcant negative impact on the levels of tax revenue, that is, corruption of
politicians signiﬁcantly erodes the tax base and corrodes the morale of tax
payers.3 The eﬀect of taxation and tax revenues on corruption although less
clear, is evident since, for example, a higher tax rate can potentially induce
more corruption. Furthermore, a higher level of tax evasion could induce a
higher level of corruption, as politicians attempt to keep their rents high.
Another important empirical ﬁnding is that the level of corruption de-
pends on the activity that the politicians choose to ﬁnance. For some types
of public spending embezzlement of public funds is easier and/or better con-
cealed relative to other types. Thus, politicians and/or bureaucrats prefer to
shift resources to areas in which a higher rate of embezzlement is possible,
such as high-technology goods produced in oligopolistic markets. Studies
1Extensive documentation of instances of corruption can be found in the four volumes
of "The Politics of Corruption", edited by Robert Williams and other co-editors.
2For a recent survey of the economics literature on corruption see Aidt (2003).
3Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) investigated the relationship between levels of corruption
(measured by corruption perception indices) and GDP in a sample of 97 countries and
found that higher corruption is consistent with lower revenues of all types of taxes, es-
pecially from income taxes. Litina and Palivos (2010) have analytically explored the
relationship between corruption and tax evasion in an economy with a single public good.
2have shown that corruption enhances the share of military spending, pub-
lic services and order, fuel and energy, relative to education.4 Furthermore,
Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) show that natural resource abundance is an im-
portant determinant of corruption, and Hessami (2010) suggests that the
perceived level of corruption increases the share of spending on environmen-
tal protection.
In the present paper we examine the interaction between taxpayers and
politicians when both have the option to behave in a corrupt manner and
the eﬀect that this interaction has on environmental protection. Speciﬁcally
taxpayers have the option to evade part of their income, while politicians
have the option to embezzle part of the tax revenue. The extend of em-
bezzlement on the part of the politicians depends on the allocation between
activities. For simplicity we assume only two types of public spending ac-
tivities: environmental protection / abatement and education. Each activity
implies a rent seeking rate that in our model is ﬁxed and exogenous. Which
of the two activities involves more rent seeking is open to various criteria,
i.e. on whether each activity is human capital intensive, thereby involving
transparent expenses, or technology intensive, thereby involving less trans-
parent expenditure.5 For instance if spending on education is associated
with teachers’ wages while environmental protection involves high technol-
ogy investment on renewable energy and/or abatement, then environmental
protection is considered to be a more rent seeking activity.
What we observe in our model is strategic interactions between the two
groups of agents. Whenever taxpayers observe that politicians direct the
money to the more rent seeking activity, they react by increasing their evasion
rate. On the contrary whenever they observe that the politicians are not
corrupt and thus direct more money to the less rent seeking activity, they
respond by increasing their compliance rates. Multiple equilibria may arise,
one with low compliance rates and extensive rent seeking, and another with
high compliance rates and low rent seeking. This interaction that builds a
sense of reciprocity between taxpayers and politicians has been reported in
the literature.6 Furthermore, a number of studies have shown that corruption
4See for example Gupta et al.(2000), Delavallade (2006) and Mauro (1998).
5See Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and (2000) and Hessami (2010).
6For example, Alm, Mc Clelandand, and Schulze (1992) and Alm, Jackson and McKee
3seems to be contagious, or as Andvig and Moene (1990) put it "corruption
may corrupt". Whenever taxpayers feel that politicians are corrupt or that
their burden is not fair compared to others they choose to become more
corrupt as well.7
With respect to environmental policy our paper yields the following re-
sults. If environmental protection involves transparent and eﬀective expen-
ditures, then there is a reciprocal response on the part of the taxpayers who
praise politicians by increasing their compliance and consequently the overall
tax revenue and thus environmental quality. If on the other hand, environ-
mental protection is primarily a means of raising rents, that is, it involves less
transparent expenditure, taxpayers punish politicians by evading more taxes.
This reduces total tax revenue and thus public expenditure on environmental
protection / abatement, thereby reducing environmental quality.
This result accords well with real world evidence. We often observe cor-
rupt countries choosing, through non-transparent processes, highly special-
ized abatement policies and/or investment in high technology renewable en-
ergy, as a means of increasing the rent seeking rates associated with them.
In contrast, in less corrupt countries, more transparent processes are chosen
and lower shares of public funds are allocated to the high rent-seeking activ-
ities. As a result, corrupt countries often face a lower environmental quality
due to reduced overall tax revenue that leads to reduced public spending on
environmental protection.
Furthermore, given that two stable equilibria can arise, one associated
with high and the other with low corruption, we discuss how a higher level
public authority could enforce the low corruption equilibrium by changing
the tax level and / or each activity’s rate of embezzlement. In our model
the politician takes the tax and the embezzlement rates as exogenous and
she chooses only the distribution of public funds between the two activities.
In this sense, she is a lower level politician, that is, a bureaucrat. If the
bureaucrat is corrupt but the higher level politician is not, the latter can
(1992) report that the introduction of a public good in exchange for the taxes paid increases
compliance rates.
7Spicer and Becker (1980) and Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval (2006) conducted lab ex-
periments and found that taxpayers tend to evade more taxes if they believe that their
tax burden is not fair. Scholtz and Lubell (1998) have conducted a survey study and have
found that the higher the trust in government the lower the likelihood of non-compliance.
4inﬂuence the level of corruption by selecting the appropriate levels of tax
and/or the embezzlement rates.
Although the economic literature on environmental policy and corruption
is limited, there are some important contributions. Two strands of literature
have been developed attempting to analyze this topic. The ﬁrst strand fo-
cuses on the interaction between corruption and natural resources, for which a
negative relationship has been shown.8 The channel through which this nega-
tive eﬀect occurs is that natural resources enhance rent seeking activities and
therefore may lower economic performance.9 Some recent papers examine the
eﬀect of institutions on the interaction between corruption and natural re-
sources. Mehlum et al. (2006) claim that natural resources can enhance
economic growth if institutions are producer friendly and vice versa. Hodler
(2006) relates ethnically fractionalized societies with natural resources and
poor institutions, Collier and Hoeﬄer (2009) examine the eﬀect of democracy
on growth on societies with rich natural resources, while Bhattacharyya and
Hodler (2010) demonstrate that natural resources can feed corruption and
examine how this eﬀect depends on the quality of democratic institutions.
The second strand abstracts from natural resources and mainly focuses on
environmental policy. This literature is rather limited and focuses on the ef-
fect that bureaucracy has on environmental policy. Pashigian (1985) explains
how locational competition among regions with diﬀerent growth rates aﬀects
the stringency of regulations in these regions. Cropper et al. (1992) and
Helland (1998) report the eﬀect of environmental interests, of political and
budget considerations on US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA)
regulations. Lopez and Mitra (2000) examine the eﬀect of corruption and
rent seeking on the relationship between pollution and growth and on the
shape of the environmental Kuznets curve, while Fredriksson and Millimet
(2000) and Fredriksson et al. (2003) examine the eﬀect of corruption and rent
seeking on US FDI, on the pollution haven hypothesis and on environmental
policy stringency.
The present paper complements existing literature by giving an account
8See for example Leite and Widemann (2002), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003)
and Isham et al. (2005).
9See Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999), Baland and Francois (2000)
and Torvik (2002).
5of how the formation of public funds between environmental protection and
education is aﬀected by the interaction between citizens and politicians. Once
the allocation of budget has been decided, other forms of corruption, namely
lobbying activities, could come into play aiming at aﬀecting environmental
stringency. At the same time, these activities and the prospect of rent seeking
feed back into our model aﬀecting the decisions of tax payer.
Section 2 of the paper introduces the benchmark model. We resort to a
simple framework that allow us to obtain analytical results and discuss the
intuition regarding the interaction between taxpayers and politicians. More
realistic assumptions are introduced in Section 3. These assumptions increase
the complexity of our model and for this reason we resort to numerical so-
lution, which is illustrated Section 4. We prove that the main results of the
benchmark model hold in the more realistic framework. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The benchmark model
2.1 The economy
We assume an overlapping generations’ economy producing a single good.
In each period t a generation of individuals of measure one is born. Each
individual has a single parent and lives through two periods: childhood and
adulthood. In the ﬁrst period of their lives, young agents enter the public ed-
ucation system where they acquire human capital. Following the literature10
we assume that the learning technology is given by
ht = vHt−1 + AEt−1 , (1)
where t denotes time, ht the level of human capital acquired by an individual
born at t − 1, Ht−1 the average stock of human capital at time t − 1 and
Et−1 the public spending on education in the same period. According to this
human capital accumulation process, a young agent born in period t−1,c a n
pick up a fraction v ∈ [0,1] of the existing (average) level of human capital
Ht−1 without any cost, simply by observing what the previous generation
10See for example De Gregorio and Kim (2000) and Ceroni (2001).
6does.11 The enhancement of an agent’s human capital even further is possible
only with the use of resources. In this paper we consider only public education
and hence the level of public spending enters the learning technology. The
parameter A>0 measures the eﬃciency of the public education system.
For simplicity, we assume that young agents do not make any decisions.
Even their consumption is included into their parents’ consumption. In the
second period of their lives, adult agents decide their consumption level,
which also includes their oﬀsprings’ consumption. Adult agents also care
about their oﬀsprings’ future prospects, social status and well being. We
formalize their concerns by assuming that adult agents’ utility depends on
the level of human capital and the quality of environment they hand over
to the next generation.12 Formally, individuals born at t − 1, during their
adulthood, at period t, maximize the following utility function,
ut = ct (ht+1 + Qt+1) , (2)
where ct denotes adults’ levels of consumption, ht+1 their oﬀspring’s human
capital and Qt+1the environmental quality enjoyed by their oﬀsprings.13 Note
that the presence of the oﬀspring’s human capital level and environmental
quality in parental utility function results in an agent’s vested interest in
public education and public abatement. For simplicity we assume that the
marginal utility adults derive from improving their oﬀsprings’ human capital
and environmental quality is the same between the two activities.
Environmental quality is given by
Qt = Q0Ht−1 − ψHt−1 + βΠt−1,Q 0 >ψ, (3)
where Q0 denotes the initial state of environmental quality and ψ and β are
technological parameters denoting the environmental damage caused by pro-
duction and the eﬃciency of public spending on abatement Πt−1, respectively.
Equation (3) can be rewritten as Qt =( Q0 − ψ)Ht−1+βΠt−1, implying that
11The term 1−v can be taken to capture the depreciation rate of the stock of knowledge.
12We could alternatively assume that they care about their children’s health status,
being enhanced by a cleaner environment or their future prospects as well, assuming that
environmental quality enters both the utility function and the production function in the
form of natural resources (we will illustrate such a case in the following section).
13We could introduce a parameter measuring the strength of the altruistic motive, how-
ever this would further complicate our analysis without gaining intuition.
7environmental quality depends linearly on the average stock of human capital
at t.14 This speciﬁcation derives from the assumption that the only produc-
tive factor is human capital. Despite being quite restrictive, this formulation
allows us to derive analytical solutions and provide intuitive results. Further-
more, the main results derived from this model hold also in a richer and more
realistic formulation which will be introduced latter and illustrated through
numerical simulations.
At the end of her childhood period each individual chooses, via a random
process, one of the two following types of occupations: productive citizen in
the private sector or politician. Individual preferences are independent of
occupation. For simplicity we assume that there is a continuum of agents
within each group that is normalized to unity. The subscripts c and p are used
to denote variables that are related to citizens and politicians, respectively.
Citizen
The citizen assumes production of a single good consumed by both groups.
Assuming that human capital is the only factor of production and using the
appropriate normalization of units, citizen’s output and income yct equals
the level of human capital,15
yct = ht. (4)
The assumption that human capital is the only productive factor, implies
that environmental quality Qt supports individuals’ lives and increases their
utility, but it does not contribute to production. Citizen’s income is taxed at
ar a t eτ, assumed to be exogenous and time invariant. The citizen decides
upon the fraction zt of her income that declares to the tax authority. For
simplicity, we assume that the citizen’s declaration is never audited by the
authority; consequently, tax evasion does not involve any risk. Although in
this setting tax is a voluntary contribution, citizens always declare a positive
fraction of their income, as we will verify below, because they care about
their oﬀsprings’ education and environmental quality.
Politicians
14Given that public spending on abatement Πt−1 is ﬁnanced by tax revenues which are
collected from individuals’ income derived from their human capital, as it will be explained
below.
15Since all agents have the same level of human capital we omit the subscript i = c,p
from the level of human capital ht.
8The politician’s role lies in allocating public funds between education (a
fraction 1−φ of the total tax revenue) and abatement (a fraction φ) activities.
The politician receives a ﬁxed income, which for simplicity and without loss
of generality we assume zero and she has the option to embezzle part of the
total tax revenue. More speciﬁcally, she can embezzle a rate (1 − ωq) of the
funds directed to public abatement, and a rate (1−ωh) of the funds directed
to public education. We assume that both ωq and ωh are exogenously given,
strictly positive and less than one. Their relative values, that is, whether
ωq ≷ ωh, depends mainly on the choice of abatement actions, since educa-
tion involves mainly transparent transactions, such as wages and standard
equipment, and thus, it is associated with low rates of rent seeking.16 On the
other hand, rent seeking rates on abatement can vary signiﬁcantly depending
on the choice of abatement technology. If public spending is directed toward
actions relying on wages and standard equipment, such as reforestation and
protection of biodiversity, then rent seeking activities are rather limited. If
however, technology-intensive abatement methods are chosen, then the rent
seeking margin is much larger. The relevant literature suggests that the more
technology-intensive is an activity, the higher corruption it usually involves
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
The politician observes the values of ωq and ωh before allocating the
available public funds between the two activities. For simplicity we assume
that the politician is never investigated and hence peculation does not involve
any risk. Still, given the politician’s vested interest in public education and
environmental quality, 1−ϕ may not be equal to 1 (when ωq <ω h ), or equal
to 0 (when ωq >ω h)a si ti sv e r i ﬁed below.
Total tax revenue collected in period t is Rt = ztτht. A fraction (1 −
ϕt)ztτht of this is earmarked for public education. Nevertheless, the politician
peculates a fraction 1 − ωh of this sum. Hence, the actual amount spent on
education Et is
Et =( 1− ϕt)ωhztτht . (5)
The remaining fraction ϕtztτht of the tax revenue is spend on preserving
environmental quality. After the intervention of the politician, only a fraction
16The literature shows that the rate of rent-seeking in education is low but can vary
across countries (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005) depending on the overall level of corruption
and the expenses involved.
9ωq of this amount is actually spend on abatement activities,
Πt = ϕtωqztτht . (6)
Evidently, adults’ decisions at time t regarding z and ϕ aﬀect public spending
on education and abatement and consequently the human capital and envi-
ronmental quality enjoyed by their oﬀsprings. Given the assumptions that
adults care about their oﬀsprings’ well being and that tax evasion and pecu-
lation are risk free, the only factor determining each type of agent’s choice is
the other type of agent’s decision. That is, the citizen’s choice of tax evasion
depends on the politician’s choice of peculation and vice versa. We assume
that both individuals make their choices simultaneously. In what follows we
examine the strategic interaction between the two types of individuals.
2.2 Individual optimization
Citizen
As mentioned above, in period t an adult citizen’s gross income is ht.A
fraction zt of this is declared to the tax authorities and an amount τztht is
paid as income tax. Hence, each citizen’s disposable income is (1 − τ)ztht +






cct =( 1 − ztτ)ht , (8)
cct ≥ 0, 1 ≥ zt ≥ 0 ,
where h, Q, E and Π are determined by equations (1), (3), (5) and (6), taking
ϕt, Q0 and Ht as given.
Maximization of the above yields the citizen’s best response function:
zt = f(ϕt)=
(Aωh − ϕtΩT) − Ψ
2τ(Aωh − ϕtΩT)
, (9)
where ΩT = Aωh − βωq and Ψ = Q0 − ψ + v. N o t et h a ts i n c eϕ ≤ 1,
Aωh−ϕtΩT > 0, securing that concavity always holds. Inspection of equation
10(9) reveals that an interior solution (0 <z<1)e x i s t si ﬀ (2τ − 1)(Aωh −
ϕtΩT) < Ψ <A ω h − ϕtΩT. On the other hand, a corner solution zt =
min{0, 1
2τ − Ψ
2τAωh} (zt =1 ) will emerge if Ψ ≥ (Aωh − ϕtΩT) (Ψ ≤ (2τ −
1)(Aωh − ϕtΩT)), that is, if the rate of human capital transferred freely to
the next generation, v,i ss u ﬃciently high (low), the rate of degradation
of environmental quality, ψ, suﬃciently low (high) and the initial state of
the environment, Q0, high (low). Capturing a large (small) percentage of
the existing human capital freely implies that parents have a weak (strong)
incentive to invest in education and thus declare none (all) of their income to
the tax authorities. Respectively, starting oﬀ with an environmental quality
that is rather high (low) implies that parents have a weak (strong) incentive
to invest in abatement and thus declare none (all) of their income to the tax
authorities. Reversely when environmental damage from production, ψ,i s
limited (extensive) then parents choose to evade all (none) of their income
for abatement.
Whenever an interior solution emerges, the tax evasion rate (1 − zt)i s
negatively aﬀected by the eﬃciency of the education system (A)a n dt h e
abatement technology (β), and positively aﬀected by the rates of rent seeking
(1−ωh), (1−ωq) and the tax rate τ.N o t i c e a b l y ,f o rs u ﬃciently high τ (τ>1
2)
the tax evasion rate is never zero, since zt < 1.17 For a high level of tax,
citizens will always choose to evade some fraction of their income; below this
level they might choose to declare all their income to the tax authority.18
Politician
Assuming zero income from other sources, the politician derives income
only through the embezzlement of public funds directed to education and
abatement19. That is, her income is, ϕt(1−ωq)τztHt+(1−ϕt)(1−ωh)τztHt.




17From (9), zt < 1= ⇒ (1 − 2τ)(Aωh − ϕΩT) < Ψ,f o rw h i c has u ﬃcient condition is
τ>1
2, given that both Ψ and (Aωh − ϕΩT) are positive.
18Citizens might choose to evade taxes even at lower tax rates. τ>1
2 is a suﬃcient not
a necessary condition for z<1.
19Assuming a ﬁxed wage for the politician would only alter the scale of our results, not
their qualitative characteristics.
11subject to
cpt =[ ϕt(1 − ωq)+( 1− ϕtt)(1 − ωh)]τztHt, (11)
cpt ≥ 0, 1 ≥ ϕt ≥ 0,
where h, Q, E and Π are determined by equations (1), (3), (5) and (6), taking
zt, Q0 and Ht as given.
Straightforward maximization yields the politicians’ best response func-
tion,
ϕt = g(zt)=









where Ω = ωh−ωqand ΩT = Aωh−βωq.N o t i c eﬁrst that for concavity to hold
we must have ΩTΩ > 0. Furthermore, an interior solution (0 <ϕ<1)e x i s t s
iﬀ τzt(1 − ωh)
ΩT
Ω < Ψ <τ z t [2(1 − ωq) − (1 − ωh)]
ΩT
Ω . On the other hand,
corner solutions, leading to the commitment of the total public revenue to a
single policy (ϕt =m i n {0,−
(1−ωh)
2Ω } and ϕt =1 ), emerge depending mainly
on the values of ωh,ω q. The politician will allocate the total revenue to
abatement if the rate of rent seeking on abatement is not too high relative
to that on education, that is, if
1−ωq
1−ωh < 1





Not surprisingly, ϕt is decreasing in A, and increasing in β,w h i l ei t
depends on τ.T h e e ﬀect of the tax rate on the allocation of public rev-
enues depends on the sign of ΩT,s i n c eΩT ≷ 0= ⇒
∂ϕt
∂τ = −1
2τ2ztΩT ≶ 0.I f
ΩT > 0= ⇒ Aωh >β ω q, that is, public revenues directed to education are
more eﬀective, both due to better technology and lower rate of rent seek-
ing, then the politician allocates less revenue to abatement as the tax rate
increases. She does so in order to maximize the eﬀectiveness of pubic spend-
ing21 and to maximize her own income by minimizing citizens’ tax evasion.22
Strategic Interactions
We now turn to examine the strategic interaction between the two types of




2.t h e nτzt [2(1 − ωq) − (1 − ωh)] ΩT
Ω < 0,g i v e nt h a tΩT
Ω > 0, and therefore
ϕ =1 .
21Recall that the politicain also cares about her oﬀsprings well being.
22Citizens are willing to pay higher taxes when they observe the politician to direct a








2τ(Aωh−ϕΩT)3 < 0 since Aωh−ϕΩT > 0.








t ΩT . Therefore, the sign of reaction functions’ slope depends on
the sigh of the term ΩT. More precisely, we can have the following two cases:
i) ΩT < 0= ⇒ ∂zt
∂ϕt > 0,
∂ϕt
∂zt > 0 i.e.. Strategic Complements
ii) ΩT > 0= ⇒ ∂zt
∂ϕt < 0,
∂ϕt
∂zt < 0 i.e. Strategic Substitutes
Case (i) refers to situations in which public spending on education is less
productive relative to abatement, either due to relatively higher rates of rent
seeking or due to worse transformation technology. In this case, the reaction
functions of the two types of individuals are positively sloped, and in this
sense their choice variables are strategic complements. Citizens’ utility in-
creases as a higher share of public revenue is directed to the improvement of
environmental quality, which is the more productive activity.23 Hence, if they
observe that the politician indeed directs higher amounts to abatement, they
choose to treat in a similar manner and they evade less (zt increases). Re-
versely, if politicians become more corrupt, by choosing to direct more funds
to the non-productive activity (in this case to public education), then citizens
"punish" them by evading more taxes. Put diﬀerently, citizens reciprocate
to the "ethical" behavior of the politicians and vise versa.
Interestingly in case (ii) while both groups’ strategies are strategic substi-
tutes, the outcome is the same. Analytically, if the more productive activity
is public education but politicians choose to invest a higher share of pub-
lic funds on abatement (increase ϕt), citizens punish them by declaring less
income and vice versa. Therefore in terms of the outcome both types of
interaction are symmetric. For this reason we choose to present only one of
the two cases, that of strategic complements, which is also the most realistic
according to the empirical evidence discussed in the introduction.
In the case of strategic complements, both types of individuals’ reaction
functions are increasing in a decreasing rate, that is, ∂zt
∂ϕt > 0, ∂2zt




(∂zt)2 < 0. From (9) we have that zt|ϕt=0 = f(ϕt =0 )=
Aωh−Ψ
2τAωh ,
which is the citizen reaction function’s vertical intercept. For this to be less
23Note that we have assumed that marginal utility of human capital and environmental
quality are the same.
13than unity requires that τ>1
2− Ψ
2Aωh. Note that the politician tends to direct
all revenues to public education (in this case the more rent-seeking activity),
as citizens declare a small part of their income, that is, from (12) we have
lim
zt→0ϕt = −∞. From (12) we also derive that ϕt =0= ⇒ zt = ΨΩ
τ(1−ωh)ΩT .
For this to be less than unity requires that τ> ΨΩ














Figure 1: Reaction functions
citizen’s (Rc) and the politician’s (Rp) reaction functions in the case that
both possible intersections occur within (0,1). Three equilibria may occur
denoted by the points Eh,E ns and El. Using best reply dynamics we observe
that Eh and El are stable equilibria whereas Ens is an unstable equilibrium.
Eh denotes the high corruption equilibrium (since zt =m i n {0, 1
2τ − Ψn
2τAωh}
and ϕt =0implies high tax evasion and that the total tax revenue is directed
to the less eﬀective activity24)w h e r e a sEl denotes the low corruption equi-
24Recall that we examine the case of strategic complements, therefore Aωh <β ω q which
implies that abatement is more eﬀective than education spending.
14librium where citizens declare part of their income (zt > 0) and a positive
part of the tax revenue is directed to the more eﬀective activity (ϕt > 0).
2.3 Equilibrium
The interaction between the two types of individuals can be described as
a coordination game in which there are strategic complementarities (sub-
stitutabilities).25 Games of strategic complementarity (substitutability) are
those in which the best response of any player is increasing (decreasing) in the
actions of the rival, as is the case for zt and ϕt. Strategic complementarity is
a necessary condition for the existence of multiple equilibria in symmetric co-
ordination games.26 The resulting equilibria are not driven by fundamentals.
Instead, they are self-fulﬁlling and critically depend on the expectation of
one group concerning the behavior of the other. Nevertheless, the game that
we analyze here is not symmetric. Moreover the choice space is bounded and
this necessitates the consideration of corner solutions. In fact, as we show be-
low, this game does not share many of the properties of games with strategic
complementarities. Consider ﬁrst the following deﬁnition of equilibrium:











c,p, such that, given an initial average stock of human capital H−1 > 0 and
an average level of environmental quality Q−1 > 0, in every period t,
1. Private citizens choose zt to maximize their utility, taking ϕt as given.
2. Politicians choose ϕt to maximize their utility, taking zt as given.







are determined according to (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), and (11).
4. ht = Ht.
25See, for example, Cooper and John (1988) and Vives (2005).
26Notice however that also in games with strategic substitutability multiple equilibria
may occur as well (Randon, 2009).
15Each group’s individual optimization problem is well deﬁned since its
utility function is strictly concave and the budget constraint linear with re-
spect to the relevant decision variable, zt or ϕt. In Proposition 1 below, we
prove the existence of a pair (zt,ϕ t) that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1 in every period.
Given the existence of the equilibrium pair (zt,ϕ t), we can easily establish
the equilibrium values of the remaining variables, following Deﬁnition 1.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium pair (zt,ϕ t) exists.
Proof. We must establish the existence of a pair (zt,ϕ t) that satisﬁes
equations (9) and (12) simultaneously. For an arbitrary time period t,l e t
zt = f(ϕt) denote the solution to the citizen’s problem, as described by
equation (9); for each value of the allocation rate ϕt there exists a unique
value of the tax evasion rate zt. Similarly, let ϕt = g(zt) denote the solution
to each politician’s problem, as described by equation (12). Note that both
of these functions are continuous (see equations (9) and (12)). Thus, the
composite function g ◦ f from [0,1] to [0,1] is continuous and, by Brower’s
ﬁxed point theorem, has a ﬁxed point.
Solving for the equilibrium values of individuals’ choice variables, yields,
z∗
































where, Ξ = ωhωq (A − β) − ΩT. For the non-zero equilibrium values of z to





That is, for the citizen to declare any positive amount of his income to the
tax authority, the ratio of technological eﬃciency of abatement to education
should exceed the ratio of the rates of embezzlement. Depending on the pa-
rameter values, suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a unique or multiple
equilibria can be established. We call an equilibrium interior (corner) if it
lies in the interior (on the boundary) of the unit square. Figure 1 presents
an example in which there are three equilibria: the corner one Eh (z∗
1,ϕ ∗
1)
and two that their elements are less than one. Note that Ens (z∗
2,ϕ ∗
2) is not




We have assumed that the tax rate, τ, and the rates of embezzlement ωh
and ωq are exogenously given. However, a political authority at a higher level
of decision making relative to our politician, can change both the tax rate
through new regulation and the embezzlement rates through institutional
changes. That is, our setting can be interpreted as a situation in which a
regulator sets τ, ωh and ωq and a bureaucrat (our politician) chooses only ϕ.
Straightforward manipulations of (9) indicate that in order to preclude the
full corruption corner solution Eh (z∗
1,ϕ ∗
1) in Figure 1, a policy maker must
either contain rent seeking on education spending,27 or contain rent seeking
on abatement activities.28 As far as tax policy is concerned, the condition
τ<1
2 is necessary for a nil-corruption (zt =1 ) equilibrium to be feasible.
Can the policy maker ensure that the no corruption equilibrium is always
chosen? Suﬃciently low tax rates and high ωh,ω q cannot ensure zt =1since
other variables, i.e. A, β,a n dΨ, play an important role as well. Therefore,
the main concern of the regulator should be to eliminate the corner solution
zt =m i n {0, 1
2τ − Ψn
2τAωh}.
Assuming strategic complementarity, i.e. ΩT < 0, equation (12) implies
that the regulator should try to preclude that ϕt =0 , i.e. that the total tax
revenue is directed to the less eﬀective activity, that is, education spending
(since ΩT < 0 ⇒ Aωh <ϕ ΩT). In this case the regulator should make the
appropriate institutional changes that will decrease the value of ωq relative
to ωh.29
Dynamics
Due to the set-up of the model, neither the reaction functions nor the
equilibrium values for z∗ and ϕ∗ depend on the evolution of ht and therefore
an equilibrium always exists. However we must study the evolution of human
capital and to ﬁnd the appropriate conditions that ensure the stability of the
diﬀerence equation (1). The diﬀerence equation is homogeneous and therefore
its solution is given by:
ht = b
th0 ,
27Setting ϕ =0yields that a necessary condition for zt > 0 implies Aωh > Ψ.
28Setting ϕ =1yields that a necessary condition for zt > 0 implies βωq > Ψ.
29Note from eq. (12) that for ϕt > 0 (for zt =0 ) we must assume that ωh >ω q. Even
for zt =1 , the condition ωh >ω q is not necessary but suﬃcient for ϕt > 0.
17where b = A(1−ϕt)ωhztτ+v. Following Chiang (1984) for stability to hold we
require that b<1. Additionally the fact that b>0 indicates non-oscillatory
convergence to the steady state.
If equation (1) approaches a steady state then the same holds for equation
(3) since it can be rewritten as
Qt+1 =( Qo − ψ + vϕtωqztτ)ht ,
and therefore the solution is given by,
Qt =( Qo − ψ + vϕtωqztτ)b
th0 .
3 A natural resources model: A numerical
illustration
In order to reinforce the results of the previous section, we develop a more
realistic framework in this section. We will show, using numerical simula-
tions since analytical solutions cannot be derived, that the main properties of
the basic model hold in this more elaborate setting. The main improvement
in the model concerns the treatment of the environment. We assume that
the environment, either as environmental quality aﬀecting citizens’ produc-
tive capacity, and/or as natural resources, contribute to production. This
assumption adds realism to our model but it signiﬁcantly complicates the
analysis. For this reason, we will provide analytical results only for the reac-
tion functions and then we will resort to numerical analysis in order to deﬁne
a range of values for which the model returns plausible results.
3.1 The economy
The learning technology in the public education system is quite similar as in
the basic model and given by,
ht = v + AEt−1 . (13)
The diﬀerence with (3) lies in that we assume that individuals acquire, with-
out eﬀort, a minimum level of human capital instead of a fraction v ∈ [0,1]
of the previous period’s accumulated human capital.30
30This assumption is also standard in the literature and does not aﬀect our results.
18The ﬁrst signiﬁcant diﬀerence with the previous model is introduced in
the equation of motion for the environment, which now is,
Qt = Qt−1 − 2ψHt−1Qt−1 + βΠt−1 (14)
where Qt−1 denotes the state of the environment in the previous period and
ψ the extent of environmental damage, or the rate of the natural resource
depletion, caused by production as in the basic model. We assume that
1−2ψHt−1 > 0, that is, production cannot deplete the environment / natural
resource. This formulation is rather common in the literature and more
plausible than our previous speciﬁcation.31
Production uses both human capital and the environment / natural re-
sources as inputs. That is, we assume that citizens’ output yct is,32
yct = htQt. (15)
Evidently at the aggregate level there are increasing returns to scale, which
is not the case at the individual level since the quantity of each factor of pro-
duction is predetermined by the previous period’s choices. We assume that
citizens receive income for both factors of production. Therefore, citizens’
income is the sum of the two inputs’ marginal products. That is, citizens’




∂QtQt = htQt+htQt =2 htQt.
Both types of individuals make the same choices by maximizing their
utility function described by equation (2) as in the basic model. The citizen
chooses the fraction z of her income to declare to the tax authority and the
politician the fraction ϕ of the total tax revenue to allocate to abatement /
preservation of natural resources.
In this model the total tax revenue collected within a period t is Rt =
2ztτhtQt. As in the previous model a fraction (1 − ϕt)2ztτhtQt of the total
tax revenue is earmarked for public education. Since the politician peculates
af r a c t i o n1 − ωh of (1 − ϕt)Rt, the actual amount spent on education Et is
Et =( 1− ϕt)ωh2ztτhtQt. (16)
31See for example, John and Pecchenino (1994) and Economides and Philippopoulos
(2008).
32Since all agents have the same level of human capital and the natural resource is
commonly owned, we ommit the subscript i = c,p from both variables.
19The remaining fraction ϕt2ztτhtQt of the collected revenue is earmarked
for public abatement. The politician peculates a fraction 1−ωq of this sum,
leaving Πt to be spent on abatement
Πt = ϕtωqztτ2htQt. (17)
Individual optimization decisions regarding zt and ϕt aﬀect the sum and
the allocation of public spending between education and abatement and con-
sequently the human capital and the state of the environment / natural
resources enjoyed by the next generation.
3.2 Individual optimization
Citizen
Citizens declare a fraction zt of their income Yct to the tax authority and
an amount τztht is paid as income tax. Hence, citizens’ disposable income is
(1−τ)zt2htQt+(1−zt)2htQt =( 1−ztτ)2htQt. The individual optimization





cct =( 1 − ztτ)2htQt , (19)
cct ≥ 0, 1 ≥ zt ≥ 0 ,
where h, Q, E and Π are determined by equations equations (13), (14) (16)
and (17), taking ϕt, Ht and Qt as given.
Maximization yields the citizens’ best response function,
zt = f(ϕt)=
2HtQt (Aωh − ϕtΩT) − Ψn
2τ2HtQt (Aωh − ϕtΩT)
, (20)
where Ψn = Qt + v − ψ2HtQt. Concavity holds since Aωh − ϕtΩT > 0.
Citizens’ reaction function in (20) has similar characteristics as the one in








2τ2HtQt(Aωh−ϕΩT)3 < 0 since Aωh −
ϕtΩT > 0. Therefore, as in the basic model, the sign of citizen reaction
20function’s slope depends on the sigh of the term ΩT. The intercept of citizen’s
reaction function is, zt|ϕt=0 = f(ϕt =0 )=
2HtQtAωh−Ψn
2τ2HtQtAωh . For this to be less
than unity requires that τ>1
2 − Ψn
2HtQt2Aωh.
The main diﬀerence from the basic model is that in (20) the strategy of
the citizen, zt, depends not only the strategy of the politician, ϕt,b u to n
the realized values of Ht and Qt. The values of these terms evolve over time
until the economy approaches a steady state (in case it exists) and therefore
the optimal strategy diﬀe r sa m o n gg e n e r a t i o n s .H o w e v e rn o t i c et h a ta tt i m e
t the values of Ht and Qt have been already determined by the previous
generation and therefore each generation treats them as exogenous.
Inspection of equation (20) reveals that an interior solution (0 <z<1)
exists iﬀ (2τ − 1)2HtQt (Aωh − ϕtΩT) < Ψn < 2HtQt (Aωh − ϕtΩT).A
corner solution zt =m i n {0,
2HtQtAωh−Ψn
2τ2HtQtAωh } (zt =1 )will emerge if the rate of
human capital transferred freely to the next generation, v,i ss u ﬃciently high
(low), the rate of degradation of environmental quality, ψ, suﬃciently low
(high) and the rent reeking rates, (1−ωh) and (1−ωq), suﬃciently high. As
in the basic model. for suﬃciently high τ (τ<1
2), the tax evasion rate is
never zero, since z<1.
Whenever an interior solution emerges, the tax evasion rate (1 − zt) is
negatively aﬀected by the eﬃciency of the education system (A)a n dt h e
abatement technology (β), and positively aﬀected by the rates of rent seeking
(1 − ωh) and (1 − ωq) and the tax rate τ.
Politician
The politician’s income is derived solely from peculation of tax revenues






cpt =[ ϕt(1 − ωq)+( 1− ϕt)(1 − ωh)]τzt2htQt , (22)
cpt ≥ 0, 1 ≥ ϕt ≥ 0 ,
where h, Q, E and Π are determined by equations equations (13), (14) (16)
and (17), taking ϕt, Ht and Qt as given.











where X =( 1 − ωh)ΩT − AωhΩ. Similar to the benchmark model, for









t2HtQtΩT .T h es i g no f
reaction functions’ slope depends on the sign of the term ΩT.
F o ri n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n s( 0 <ϕ<1)i ti sr e q u i r e dt h a tτzt2HtQt
X
Ω < Ψn <
τzt2HtQt
2ΩTΩ+X
Ω . On the other hand, corner solutions of directing revenue
to a unique policy (ϕt =0and ϕt =1 , respectively) emerge depending on
the values of ωh,ω q.M o r e o v e r ,ϕt is decreasing in A, and increasing in β.
Similarly to the benchmark case the eﬀect of tax rate on the allocation of
revenue depends on the sign of Aωh − βωq and the same goes for the eﬀects









∂v ≷ 0. Overall we observe that despite the fact that our setting is more
complex and realistic, in terms of reaction functions the two models make
the same predictions. As was the case with the citizen reaction function, the
politician’s reaction function also depends on the realized values of Ht and
Qt which are predetermined by the previous generation and therefore each
generation of politicians treats them as exogenous.
Strategic Interactions
Strategic interaction in this setting are similar to the benchmark case.
As we show above, the sign of both reaction functions’ slope depends on the
sign of the term ΩT. Analytically
i) ΩT < 0= ⇒ ∂zt
∂ϕt > 0,
∂ϕt
∂zt > 0 i.e.. Strategic Complements
ii) ΩT > 0= ⇒ ∂zt
∂ϕt < 0,
∂ϕt
∂zt < 0 i.e. Strategic Substitutes
The same discussion regarding the reaction functions, as in the previous
section applies here as well. Even though the values of Ht and Qt aﬀect the
magnitude of both the intercept and the slope of both reaction functions,
they do not aﬀect the direction of the interactions.
223.3 Equilibrium
The deﬁnition of equilibrium remains the same in both models. However,
the existence of equilibrium is more complicated in this model. Each group’s
individual optimization problem is well deﬁned since its utility function is
strictly concave and the budget constraint linear with respect to the relevant
decision variable, zt or ϕt. In Proposition 2 below, we prove the existence
of a pair (zt,ϕ t) that satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1 in every period, for given values
of Ht and Qt. Given the existence of the equilibrium pair (zt,ϕ t), we can
easily establish the equilibrium values of Ht and Qt and subsequently of the
remaining variables, following Deﬁnition 1.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium pair (zt,ϕ t) exists for given values of Ht and
Qt.
Proof. We must establish the existence of a pair (zt,ϕ t) that satisﬁes
equations (20) and (23) simultaneously. For an arbitrary time period t,l e t
zt = f(ϕt,h t,Q t) denote the solution to each citizen’s problem, as described
by equation (20); for each value of the allocation rate ϕt there exists a unique
value of the evasion rate zt. Similarly, let ϕt = g(zt,h t,Q t) denote the solution
to each politician’s problem, as described by equation (23). Note that both
of these functions are continuous (see equations (20) and (23)). Thus, the
composite function g ◦ f from [0,1] to [0,1] is continuous and, by Brower’s
ﬁxed point theorem, has a ﬁxed point.
Solving for the equilibrium values of the model we obtain,33
z∗




2 = f2(ht,Q t)
z∗




2 = g2(ht,Q t)
ϕ∗
3 = g3(ht,Q t)
(24)
Therefore in terms of strategies there always exists an equilibrium for
given values of ht and Qt. Since however there is a law of motion describing
how these two variables evolve, there will be diﬀerent equilibrium values in
each period for zt and ϕt unless the system approaches a steady state. The
dynamics of the model are analyzed in the following subsection.
33We omit analytical expression due to their complexity.
233.4 Dynamic behavior of the system of diﬀerence equa-
tions





3) using best reply dynamics. Since the set (z∗
1,ϕ ∗
1)
represents a trivial equilibrium of full corruption we will focus on the low-
corruption equilibrium (z∗
3,ϕ ∗
3). Replacing the equilibrium values for (z∗
3,ϕ ∗
3)
from equation (24) into equations. (13), (14) we obtain the following system
of two autonomous non-linear ﬁrst order diﬀerence equations
ht+1 = F(ht,Q t) ,
Qt+1 = G(ht,Q t) ,
where Qo and h0 denote the initial values for ht and Qt and are exogenously
given. The dynamics of the system are too complex to be analytically studied.
Still though we can describe analytically and numerically the kind of solution
that is desirable in order for our model to be meaningful.
In order to approximate the dynamics of our benchmark model, i.e. a
set of equilibrium values for (zt,ϕ t) that remain unchanged in every period,
our system of diﬀerence equations must reach a steady state. Therefore we
ﬁrst assume that the dynamic system has steady-state equilibrium (¯ h, ¯ Q).
Namely, ∃ (¯ h, ¯ Q) such that
¯ h = F(¯ h, ¯ Q) ,
¯ Q = G(¯ h, ¯ Q) .
A Taylor expansion of the system around the steady state values (¯ h, ¯ Q),
yields:
ht+1 = F(ht,Q t) (25)
= F(¯ h)+Fh(¯ h, ¯ Q)(ht − ¯ h)+FQ(¯ h, ¯ Q)(Qt − ¯ Q)+R1 + R2 ,
Qt+1 = G(ht,Q t) (26)
= G( ¯ Q)+Gh(¯ h, ¯ Q)(ht − ¯ h)+GQ(¯ h, ¯ Q)(Qt − ¯ Q)+R1 + R2 ,
where Fh(¯ h, ¯ Q) and Gh(¯ h, ¯ Q) are the partial derivatives of the functions
F(ht,Q t) and G(ht,Q t) evaluated at (¯ h, ¯ Q) and R1 and R2 are the error
24terms which are very small in the neighborhood of (¯ h, ¯ Q) a n dh a v el i t t l ei n -
ﬂuence on the behavior of the system. Thus, the non-linear system is been













Fh(¯ h, ¯ Q) FQ(¯ h, ¯ Q)
Gh(¯ h, ¯ Q) GQ(¯ h, ¯ Q)
¸∙
ht − ¯ h




J(¯ h, ¯ Q)=
∙
Fh(¯ h, ¯ Q) FQ(¯ h, ¯ Q)
Gh(¯ h, ¯ Q) GQ(¯ h, ¯ Q)
¸
, (27)
is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state equilibrium.
If all eigenvalues of J(¯ h, ¯ Q) have moduli strictly less than 1, (¯ h, ¯ Q) is
asymptotically stable (a sink). If at least one eigenvalue of J(¯ h, ¯ Q) has mod-
ulus greater than 1, then (¯ h, ¯ Q) is unstable (a source). If the eigenvalues of
J(¯ h, ¯ Q) a r ea l li n s i d et h eu n i tc i r c l e ,b u ta tl e a s to n ei so nt h eb o u n d a r y( h a s
modulus 1), then (¯ h, ¯ Q) may be stable, asymptotically stable or unstable.
Therefore we take the following steps:
i) Test whether our system approaches the steady state (¯ h, ¯ Q).
ii) For this steady state to be a feasible solution, the dynamics of the
system must satisfy the limitations of the model, namely concavity and the
implied values ¯ z ≤ 1, ¯ ϕ ≤ 1. Second the dynamics of the system must be
characterized by stability, i.e. the eigenvalues must be inside the unit circle.
If the above restrictions hold, then we are fully able to describe the be-
havior of the equilibrium values of (z∗,ϕ ∗) in every period of the model up to
the steady state. Why is it important to have a stable steady state? Because
if the system is unstable, then ht and Qt grow without limits and taking into
account that ∂z∗
∂ht > 0, ∂z∗
∂qt > 0 this implies that as ht and Qt grow without
bound the same will hold for zt which will eventually become equal to unity.
4 Numerical approximations
The model in Section 3 closely follows the benchmark model up to the point
were we obtain the reaction functions. However due to occurring system of
non-linear diﬀerence equations it quickly becomes rather complicated. There-
fore we will make some numerical calculations illustrating our results. In
25order to highlight the similarities between the models in Sections 3 and 4, we
simulate the benchmark model as well and we present the results graphically.
In what follows we will shortly describe the procedure followed to obtain our
equilibrium values in the natural resources model.
As became evident from the analysis of both models, the term driving
most of the results is Aωh−βωq which deﬁnes the type of strategic interaction
between the two groups of agents. Therefore we assume a wide range of
parameters for the variables A, β, ωh, ωq and we also let τ vary in order to
derive some comparative statics results with respect to policy implications.
Since the model is an abstract characterization of reality, it is diﬃcult to
choose realistic parameter values. Still though with respect to tax evasion
there is some evidence that in the Western developed countries the rates
of tax evasion are estimated around 5%-25% of potential tax revenue (Feige
(1989), Pyle (1989) and Thomas (1992)) while for developing countries higher
rates may prevail (Tanzi and Shome (1994)). For the year 1988 in the US,
the TCMP has estimated that only 53% of the population has paid its taxes
correctly. Of course non compliance does not apply to all these cases, since
a 7% has overpaid its taxes while a part of the remaining 40% has underpaid
due to errors that result from the complicated procedure involved. According
to Fanzoni (1998) the federal income tax gap of the US had been estimated
for 1998 at 17%.
Concerning the values of ωh and ωq t h e r ei sm u c he v i d e n c et h a td i ﬀerent
allocations of public budget are associated with diﬀerent rent-seeking rates.
Mauro (1998) ﬁnds evidence that public expenditure on high-technology
goods is associated with higher rent-seeking due to low detectability and the
same goes for military expenditure. On the other hand, education and health
sectors involve more transparent expenditure and are thus associated with
lower rent-seeking rates. The literature on rent-seeking, estimates the social
waste corruption imposes in each sector. Speciﬁcally, increases by one unit
in perceived corruption (in the BI Index), reduce spending by 0.1-0.5% de-
pending on the sector.34 Even though this is a diﬀerent measure, an attempt
to associate these rates with ωh and ωq, would imply a rate of 0.5%-0.25%
34Hessami (2010) estimates this reduction to be 0.4% for the health and 0.05% for
the environmental protection sector. Mauro (1998) estimated a 0.6% reduction for the
education sector.
26depending on how corrupt a country is according to the BI Index. Tax rates
vary between 0.25-0.55.
As far as the parameters A and β are concerned it is hard to deﬁne which
range of values would be plausible and we will therefore focus on their relative
value as implied by our model, namely A>0,β>0 and Aωh <β ω q for
strategic complementarity, the case we analyze. For the value of v there is
also no evidence, still though it is easy to assume that it will take rather
small values, well below unity (see for example Ceroni (2001) takes values of
v as low as v =0 .2).
After deﬁning the range of parameter values, we also imposed the restric-
tions mentioned earlier, namely concavity, strategic complementarity and an
asymptotically stable steady state. A number of feasible steady states oc-
cur implying diﬀerent kinds of equilibria. Figure 2 illustrates a numerical
example of the natural resources economy.
Figure 2: Numerical Reaction Functions: The parameter values are A =3 ,
β =8 ,ω h =0 .7,ω q =0 .85,τ=0 .35,v=0 .025,ψ=0 .5.
Figure 2 closely resembles Figure 1, illustrating the similarities between
27the two models. Interestingly the stable equilibrium denoted E1 is given by
(z∗,ϕ ∗)=( 0 .82, 0.25). It is hard to comment on the value of ϕ∗ due to the
duality of the model with respect to the allocation of budget, still though we
observe that z∗ can take quite realistic values.
Figure 3: Numerical Reaction Functions: The parameter values are A =3 ,
β =8 ,ω h =0 .7,ω q =0 .85,τ=0 .35,v=0 .025,ψ=0 .5,Q 0 =1 .85
Plotting the benchmark economy when using the same parameter val-
ues in Figure 3 we observe that we obtain quite similar results. The stable
equilibrium denoted E1 is given by (z∗,ϕ ∗)=( 0 .86, 0.29) therefore indicat-
ing that the two models are very close even with respect to the occurring
equilibria.
5 Conclusions
The detrimental eﬀects of corruption are evident and prevalent in most so-
cieties. The problem aggravates when corruption feeds itself or to put it
28diﬀerently when "corruption corrupts". In a simple setting with two public
goods, public education and environmental protection, and two groups of
agents, politicians and citizens, we ﬁnd that when one group is corrupt it
urges the other group to behave in a corrupt manner as well. This reduces
not only the total tax revenue, due to increased tax evasion on the part of
citizens, but also reduces the part of the budget allocated to the rent seeking
activity. Is this good or bad news for environmental quality? The answer
depends on whether environmental policy is a pretext for corrupt politicians
to increase their rent seeking or whether abatement policy practically aims
at the improvement of environmental quality and involves transparent ex-
penditures.
Given that corruption is a signiﬁcant problem in many developing but
a l s o ,t oad i ﬀerent extent, in some developed countries, we believe that fur-
ther study in this ﬁeld is appropriate. There are a number of extensions
that could enrich our framework and yield further and more policy relevant
results. For example, it could be quite interesting to assume two sources of
tax revenues, income and environmental tax, and examine whether setting
diﬀerent tax levels could decrease corruption. It will also be interesting to
endogenize the selection of tax level(s) by assuming two levels of political
decision making. The sequence of the moves by the diﬀerent types of agents
could also be important and worth exploring. Finally, the eﬀect of introduc-
ing monitoring and enforcement on the actions of both types of agents should
also be examined.
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